a bstr ac t Demanding is a fundamental rhetorical strategy for marginalized groups, but recent rhetorical theories of demanding have not explained how speakers can design demands that influence addressees to accede. Although psychoanalytic and decolonial theories have identified constitutive functions, they have not explained how speakers can design demands that pressure addressees to accede, and while speech act theories have explained specific kinds of demands, they have not synthesized insights into a model of demanding generally. We draw on normative pragmatic theory to argue that speakers design demands that generate persuasive force by openly making visible their intent to influence addressees to accede and bringing to bear a reciprocal obligation for themselves and addressees to live up to the norm of "right makes might."
feature the shoring up of subject identity. Following Laclau, psychoanalytic theory has defined the fundamental problem of language as one of " signification"-the failure of language to signify "without remainder," as Christian Lundberg puts it (2012a, 299, 3) . Rhetoric, according to Lundberg, has been theorized as "the effectivity of trope in the context of failed unicity," so use of a trope is "a mode of enjoyment" that subjects "invest in" because it "lends durability to social formations" (47, 126) . In other words, the "subject identifies with an external image of itself for the sake of providing its practices of subjectivity with a kind of enjoyable retroactive coherence" (304). This account explains constitutive but not instrumental functions.
In short, psychoanalytic theories have explained how what appears to be nonserious demanding can generate grounds for political action by dint of the subject identities to which demanding gives coherence and durability in the face of the failure of language to signify without remainder. But they have not explained how demands that on face appear to be serious attempts to pressure addressees to accede can reasonably be expected to generate persuasive force.
decolonial theory of demanding Like psychoanalytic theory, decolonial theory (e.g., Enck-Wanzer 2006 and Wanzer-Serrano 2015) has foregrounded the constitutive functions of demanding. For example, Darrel Wanzer-Serrano (2015; Enck-Wanzer 2006) draws on decolonial theory to explain the "garbage offensive" launched by Young Lords Organization in the summer of 1969. Every Sunday members of the Young Lords Organization cleaned up garbage in El Barrio, a predominantly Puerto Rican section of New York City. The Young Lords Organization demanded that the New York City Sanitation Department do its job and collect the garbage. When the sanitation department refused, members of the Young Lords Organization and the El Barrio community blocked busy intersections with garbage heaps, and when people in cars and buses moved the garbage, they set fire to the garbage and cars, threw bottles, and more. Their demand strategy was instrumentally successful in pressuring the sanitation department to pick up the garbage occasionally but not regularly. In his analysis of the garbage offensive, Wanzer-Serrano foregrounds the constitutive function of demanding: it was among the acts that "successfully constituted the people and space of El Barrio as potential agents of change" (2015, 124) . Likewise, in other work WanzerSerrano has theorized the constitutive benefits of unsatisfied demands, beth innocenti and nichole kathol 54 asserting that a "demand is interesting and important precisely because it is not satisfied-which means that it continues to drive the relation between self and other, thus keeping the processes of identification open or deferred and forming the contingent foundation of a radical democratic politics" (Enck-Wanzer 2011, 63) .
Decolonial theory, he argues, is designed to explain practices that "attempt to delink from modernity/coloniality" (2015, 11) . Decolonial theorizing does not involve whole cloth rejection of theorizing that reproduces coloniality and that proceeds from geographical locations and bodies of "epistemic privilege" (24) (25) 86) . But decolonial theorizing can " re-accent" (27) Western theorizing so that the theorizing speaks from and to the global South. Significantly, decolonial theorizing involves reading marginalized discourses on their own terms. In what follows, we note in a Western accent three significant affinities of decolonial theorizing with normative pragmatic theorizing, which, like decolonial theorizing, involves attending to what social actors say and what they say they are doing (e.g., Goodwin 2001, Innocenti and Miller 2016) .
Social actors can, as numerous scholars have shown, communicatively design contexts that enable and constrain actions and interactions, creating more favorable conditions or grounds for disputation, deliberation, reflection, and the like (e.g., Aakhus and Laureij 2012; Jackson 1998; Jacobs 2006; Tracy 2012) . Wanzer-Serrano explains how participants in the garbage offensive deployed various rhetorical forms and "fundamentally altered the scene in a manner that allowed for different agents and agencies to emerge" (2015, 141) .
Wanzer-Serrano (2015) also accounts for the functioning of the garbage offensive in terms of the visibility and accountability that it generated. In terms that recall Robert Asen's description of the "responsibility attribution" function of arguing in "situations in which less powerful actors compel more powerful actors to accept public responsibility for decisions that they have made in restricted deliberative situations" (2005, 119) , Wanzer-Serrano explains that the Young Lords knew full well that New York City Sanitation Department officials would not accede to their demands that it do its job and collect garbage in El Barrio-demands that on face appeared to be serious because the sanitation department was able and expected to collect garbage in El Barrio-but they made these demands anyway in order to show that "the system" was broken. The ongoing presence of garbage in light of the ignored demands displayed "both evidence of the state's disrespectful and malicious attitude toward the community and proof of 'the system's' incapability to deal with its own intemperance" (2015, 129) . The demand strategy in the garbage offensive redesigned a space that enabled the people of El Barrio to hold the sanitation department and broader system accountable for their complicity with systemic racism and to recognize their own political agency in bringing the problems to light and addressing them.
In addition, Wanzer-Serrano analyzes a case of demanding within the Young Lords organization that was successful because it pressured the addressees to adhere to democratic norms of interaction explicitly brought to bear in a situation. Members of the cadre successfully demanded gender equality from members of the central committee by using the organization's own democratic procedures. They held a large meeting in which members of the central committee were charged, people testified, and a vote was taken to discipline the central committee members. The persuasive force of their actions, Wanzer-Serrano explains, led to "the structural reformulation of the Young Lords," which was "a direct result of the cadre asserting their rights to democratic participation and holding all members accountable to the same rules" (2015, 102). As Karen Tracy has suggested, not only the strategy of invoking rules but even the strategy of naming a norm such as "reasonable hostility" (2010, 203) makes norms available to social actors to structure interaction. Strategies make visible rules or norms and so enable interactants to hold each other accountable if they do not act in accord with them.
In sum, although Wanzer-Serrano's theorizing highlights the constitutive functions of demanding, along the way he also accounts for both constitutive and instrumental achievements in ways that align with normative pragmatic accounts. Significantly, both Wanzer-Serrano and members of the Young Lords Organization shed light on the persuasive force of strategies by pointing to the visibility and accountability that strategies generate as they change the scene or context. This kind of account describes the normative structure of demanding generally. speech act theory of demanding Speech act theories address the question of how speakers can design demands to pressure addressees to accede. The question is practical, inquiring into how demanding can be designed to do what it is ostensibly designed to do rather than inquiring into other functions demanding may serve. In addition, the question does not feature the referential functions of language but language as action.
Drawing on the fundamental insight of speech act theory that saying something is performative-that in saying something we do something (Austin 1962 )-Sarah Burgess (2013 has developed accounts of demands for apology and demands for recognition. She has described both kinds of demands as "speech acts" (2013, 352; 2015, 521) : utterances whose power is in "the saying" (2015, 530) . Rather than attempting to produce a general model of demanding, she seeks to analyze the rhetoricity of law in which the issue of "how law itself operates in response to or is affected by a demand for recognition" is overlooked-an "elision . . . repeated in the scholarly critiques that focus on recognition's pathological attachment to identity and/or its inability to challenge structures of power" (2015, 519). However, because she begins with a view of language as action, her accounts of demands for apology and for recognition point to the normative structure of demanding generally. In this section we note four key insights of her accounts, and in the following section we synthesize the insights into a coherent model of the normative structure of demanding. In doing so we necessarily elide details from her accounts of specific kinds of demands, but having a coherent general model of demanding may bring into sharper focus the "rhetorical contours" (Burgess 2015, 522, 528) of specific kinds of demands.
First, the fundamental insight of Burgess's analyses, one shared with Wanzer-Serrano's (2015) , is that uttering a demand changes the context or, as she puts it, is "an act of rhetorical invention that 'makes a scene '" (2015, 522) and "constitutes the scene of address in which it operates" (2013, 357) . For example, Burgess notes how a demand for recognition "creates the structures in which we might engage the terms of law, expose the conditions in which law's claim of recognition is made, and unsettle law's place as a frame" (2015, 532) .
Second, Burgess's analyses suggest the need to design a demand that is recognized as a demand. This means, first, that a speaker must actually utter the demand. As Burgess remarks, "both the contingency and the power of a demand for recognition is that it depends on the recognizability of the speech act itself " (2015, 530) . In addition, a speaker must openly demand, and so, on one hand, she cannot plausibly deny that she is demanding, and, on the other hand, addressees cannot plausibly deny recognizing that she is demanding. The demand must be "transparent" and "heard as a demand" (527, 528). Burgess points to the need to act openly when she notes how a speaker who demands an apology may respond to the apology: "The success of an apology depends . . . on how this apology is 'taken up' and read.
force of demanding 57 Thus the one who demands an apology judges whether the apology meets the conditions of recognizability in the particular context" (2013, 353) . By openly apologizing, the apologizer constrains the demander of the apology from easily, perfunctorily dismissing her utterance as not an apology.
Third, Burgess's analyses explain how the mere act of demanding implies that a speaker "claims the high ground, a position from which he takes authority to pass judgment on [the addressee's] speech and actions" (2013, 355) . Moreover, Burgess observes that the point of demanding an apology may be to serve as "a performance of the place (and the power) the speaker claims by virtue of the demand" (2013, 355) .
Fourth, Burgess's analyses foreground the insight that demanding entails risk: "To demand recognition is to take a risk and to occupy a place from which one might (later) be displaced. It is possible that the other might not hear the demand or understand what the demand means. It is possible that one's demand will be met with doubt. It is possible that one's demand will be read as a joke or a rhetorical question" (2015, 531), and it "might entail humiliation, injury, violence, and perhaps even death" (527).
These insights-that demanding communicatively changes the context, that it must be performed openly and recognizably, that it implies a claim to occupy the high ground, and that it entails risks-joined to Wanzer-Serrano's observation that strategies generate accountability and thereby pressure speakers to live up to norms help to account for why a demander who simply says "I demand that you do x" can in favorable circumstances reasonably expect the utterance alone to influence addressees to accede. In what follows we synthesize these insights into a model of the normative structure of demanding generally. basic normative pragmatic model Normative pragmatic theories (e.g., Goodwin 2001 Goodwin , 2007 Goodwin , 2011 Innocenti 2011; Innocenti and Miller 2016; Jacobs 2000 Jacobs , 2016 Kauffeld 1998 Kauffeld , 2001 Kauffeld , 2009 van Eemeren et al. 2014 ) explain why speech acts may reasonably be expected to influence addressees in just the way the speaker intends. The theories are normative because they locate persuasive force in norms that message designs bring to bear in a situation, and they are pragmatic because they account for the persuasive force of actual message designs. In broad outline, the basic normative pragmatic model is the following. A speaker's utterance makes visible her intent and concomitant obligation to live up to some norms. The visibility of the intent and obligation enable the speaker and beth innocenti and nichole kathol 58 addressees to hold each other accountable if they fail to live up to these norms. The utterance thus changes the context, creating two reasons for addressees to be influenced. First, they can reason that the speaker would not risk criticism for failing to discharge obligations she has incurred just by saying something unless she can meet them. Second, the speaker can reason that addressees will be influenced in order to avoid criticism for failing to meet obligations.
Normative pragmatic theories are based on Kauffeld's work in the philosophy of language, specifically a Gricean analysis of utterance meaning. Kauffeld (2001 Kauffeld ( , 2009 ) uses Grice's work to outline the intentions and subintentions that account for what it means to seriously say and mean something and Dennis Stampe's work to explain how addressees' recognition of a speaker's intentions gives some reason for them to be influenced. The basic Gricean account of utterance meaning is that a speaker not only intends her utterance to induce some response in addressees (the primary speaker intention) but also intends addressees' recognition of both the speaker's primary intention and the speaker's intention for the utterance to induce them to respond gives addressees reasons to respond just as she intends (Kauffeld 2001 (Kauffeld , 2009 ). The speaker's efforts to secure addressees' recognition of her primary intention involve her deliberate attempts to make that intention apparent. Her efforts to secure addressee's recognition of her intention that her utterance induce them to respond involve her openly attempting to make her primary intention apparent. These deliberate, open efforts to induce a response give addressees some reason to respond as the speaker intends, because the speaker incurs obligations for which addressees can hold her accountable.
How are obligations communicatively generated, and why are they potentially effective in securing the speaker's intended response? Kauffeld, drawing on Stampe's work, explains how obligations undertaken and discharged by speakers give some reason for addressees to respond as the speaker intends. This explanation is the linchpin of normative pragmatic accounts of why speakers can reasonably expect their performances of illocutionary speech acts, such as proposing and accusing, to pressure addressees to act as the speaker intends. To illustrate, consider the basic presumption of veracity. When a speaker seriously says and means an utterance, u, she incurs an obligation to speak truthfully. The obligation is fundamental because addressees who can easily dismiss a speaker's utterance as untruthful, ignorant, and the like will not experience pressure to be influenced by the utterance. So ordinarily, making an utterance licenses addressees to presume the speaker is speaking truthfully or, put differently, generates a presumption of veracity: addressees can reason that the speaker would not risk criticism for lying, ignorance, and the like, unless she had made a responsible effort to ascertain the veracity of her utterance. That presumption is one reason that is created just by making the utterance that addressees now have to be influenced by it. Obligations incurred by the speaker just by making an utterance are reciprocal, because their visibility creates a context in which both speaker and addressees can be held accountable for failing to live up to them; as speakers ought to speak with veracity, so addressees ought not act with undue skepticism, cantankerousness, and the like. So bringing to bear an obligation to speak truthfully creates a second reason for addressees to be influenced by the utterance: in order to avoid criticism for undue skepticism, cantankerousness, and the like, addressees can acknowledge the veracity of the utterance.
Of course, rhetorical influence is not as simple as this account, or any account for that matter, suggests. As Kauffeld puts it, "The presumption of veracity, upon which statements fundamentally depend for their efficacy, does not carry enough practical weight to fulfil the speaker's purpose in the face of doubt, disagreement, evasion, and opposition" (1998, 259; see also Pinto 2007) . Consequently, speakers routinely make special efforts to influence addressees to, say, carefully consider a proposal or accede to a demand-efforts in addition to the basic act of saying, "I propose x" or "I demand that you do x." In what follows we outline and analytically defend a model of the normative structure of demanding based on just the utterance "I demand that you do x." In the next section we show how the model accounts for actual message design, or the special communicative efforts that speakers made in a case of successful demanding.
normative pragmatic model of demanding
The sine qua non of demanding is openly making visible an intent to influence addressees to accede. Demanding must be recognizable as a demand; it must be serious. It would be incoherent for a speaker to say, "I demand that you do x, but I do not mean to suggest that you do x." If a speaker can plausibly deny the intent to influence addressees to accede to a demand, then demanding loses persuasive force because addressees can ignore the utterance with impunity, perhaps dismissing it by saying, "You can't be serious."
Besides an obligation to speak truthfully, what obligations do speakers incur just by demanding? What norms does demanding bring to bear in a situation and oblige speakers and addressees to live up to? As we have noted, demanding is extraordinary; it is a step outside the bounds of propriety and sounds out of place in statements of routine institutional policies and procedures. This quality indicates another part of the normative structure of demanding: demanding implies that ordinary procedures are not working, which obligates the speaker to be able to show that addressees are procedurally in the wrong. In ordinary circumstances, if an employee demands time off, the scheduling manager just needs to direct the speaker to follow protocol and make a request. But if the scheduling manager denies the employee's routine request for time off, the decision appears to be arbitrary, and the manager could not produce good reasons for denying the request, then it may be appropriate for the employee to demand time off. This scenario points to another part of the normative structure of demanding: demanding implies that addressees are substantively in the wrong, which obligates the speaker to be able to show just that. It would be incoherent to say, "I demand that you do x, but I cannot show you why x is the right thing to do."
Unlike routine requesting, demanding may routinely produce resentment just because demanding implies criticism of addressees and is designed to constrain addressees' response. Inherent to routine requesting is the possibility of addressees accepting or denying the request. A faculty member who requests something from a dean maintains the dean's wiggle room because, other things being equal, the dean can accept or deny the request with impunity; requesting acknowledges the dean's prerogative to accept or deny. If the dean is amenable to persuasion in routine ways, such as requesting, then there is no need to demand. In contrast, a faculty member who demands something from a dean implies a negative judgment about the direction of the dean's moral compass and implies that it cannot be corrected unless the dean accedes to the demands. The dean may resent how demanding both makes him look bad and reduces his wiggle room by pressuring him to accede or look even worse.
In short, demanding implies that the speaker can show that she occupies the substantive and procedural high ground. Her efforts to produce change by using ordinary procedures and routine speech acts such as requesting have failed, and so she needs to perform a different speech act to influence addressees to act. She counts on addressees seeing that she occupies the high ground, and it is her visibly being in the right that is expected to influence-to generate the persuasive force that routine speech acts such as requesting have not. Consequently, we submit that the central obligation incurred just by demanding is living up to a political, rhetorical norm that power accrued by conspicuously occupying the high ground ought to trump institutional, coercive power. This norm is captured in the aphorism "right makes might," perhaps best known to students of rhetoric in its explicit statement by Abraham Lincoln as he exhorted Republicans at Cooper Union in 1860: "Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the end, dare to do our duty as we understand it" (Holzer 2004, 284) . "Right makes might" is at the center of historical and contemporary rhetorical theorizing that describes rhetoric as a way of mitigating violence-as a counter to the position that "might makes right," or "the idea that it is acceptable for a dominant party or group to maintain power over the dominated by using coercive force" (hooks 2015, 118; Conley 1990; Crosswhite 2013) . Demanders demand rather than exercise brute force. Because demanding brings that norm to bear in the situation, both demanders and addressees can be held accountable for failing to live up to it.
How does this normative structure-openly demanding to make visible the intent to influence addressees to accede and incurring an obligation to live up to the norm of right makes might-account for why somebody uttering a statement of demand may reasonably expect just that utterance to pressure addressees to accede? The answer hinges on Burgess's (2015) and Wanzer-Serrano's (2015) insights that demanding communicatively changes the context, generates accountability, and entails risks. Bringing to bear the norm of right makes might redesigns the disagreement space ( Jackson 1992 ( Jackson , 1998 Jacobs 2006 ) such that addressees now have two reasons to be influenced. To see what these reasons are, recall the resentment that demanding can occasion. For example, if an employee demands time off without first making a request, a scheduling manager can express resentment with impunity, perhaps by saying, "All you had to do was ask!" Or if an employee demands time off on the two days before a major deadline in order to binge watch a television series, the scheduling manager can express resentment with impunity, perhaps by saying, "It is wrong to leave your colleagues in the lurch for frivolous reasons!" Because demanding implies substantive and procedural criticism of addressees, a speaker who demands risks resentment in addressees if the speaker unfairly impugns their conduct-if the speaker fails to make good on the claim to be in the right. As a result, demanding communicatively creates a context in which, first, addressees can reason that the demander would not risk criticism for unfairly impugning their conduct unless she can show she occupies 62 the high ground. Significantly, because norms that speakers bring to bear in a situation are reciprocal, bringing to bear the norm of right makes might constrains addressees from exercising institutional or coercive power, because doing so would put them at risk of criticism for using strong-arm tactics or abusing their position of authority and for failing to see the rightness of the speaker's position. Consequently, second, demanding communicatively creates a context in which a speaker can reason that addressees will accede to demands in order to avoid criticism for remaining conspicuously in the wrong, or at least give the speaker a fair hearing to avoid criticism for not adhering to institutional policies and procedures calling for a fair hearing, or for not changing policies and procedures that preclude a fair hearing. Demanding redesigns a disagreement space such that arguments may be discussed on their merits.
The pressure generated just by demanding is not compulsion. Addressees can ignore or dismiss demands with impunity if they are manifestly unreasonable-if it is apparent that the demander is not substantively in the right. Addressees can also ignore or dismiss demands with impunity if they calculate that they will not be held accountable for refusing or failing to see that they are in the wrong or if they can use strong-arm tactics with impunity. Persuasive force is grounded in responsibility and accountability, and in some circumstances persons may be held accountable for actions only after some time has passed. Addressees may also be able to dismiss demands with impunity if the demands are accompanied by coercive tactics-if it appears that the demander is not living up to the norm of right makes might. The further demanders step outside the bounds of propriety, the more conspicuously the norm of right makes might is brought to bear in the situation, but the greater the risk of criticism for apparent coercing, threatening, impropriety. At the same time, by conspicuously undertaking that risk, demanders generate more visibility and therefore accountability for making good on the obligation to show the rightness of their demands and the shortcomings of conventional modes of communication and the structures in which they occur to produce change.
Our analysis of the normative structure of demanding is based on the most basic utterance: "I demand that you do x." Typically just that utterance does not make presumptions sufficiently conspicuous to pressure addressees to accede. How can ordinary social actors design demands that generate persuasive force? Wanzer-Serrano (2015) has shown how members of the Young Lords Organization and the people of El Barrio managed to do so by acting in accord with the organization's own democratic procedures and by conspicuously displaying (by setting fire to piles of uncollected garbage in intersections) that they were substantively and procedurally in the right in demanding the sanitation department to collect garbage in El Barrio. In what follows we show how another group of marginalized people designed demands that pressured establishment members to accede. designing demanding Shortly after 5:00 p.m. on Friday, 4 February, 1972, C. J. Brune, a senior at the University of Kansas, received an excited phone call. On the other end of the line, Mary Coral, the wife of a KU faculty member, declared, "It's on. Come to the head of the alley. Bring enough clothes for a week and lots of food" (Brune 2012 ). Brune, Coral, and almost twenty other women who called themselves the February Sisters, entered the East Asian Studies building and barricaded the doors. Simultaneously, leaflets notifying the campus community that a group of women and children was now occupying a campus building hit the streets, and a statement of action was sent to Chancellor E. L. Chalmers. The statement listed six "nonnegotiable demands" including the creation of a campus day care center, the development of a women's studies program, and the establishment of women's health services. By 10:00 p.m. the Senate Executive Committee was convened, and several February Sisters representatives left the occupied building to attend a negotiation session. While the first session was fruitless, a second session ended with the committee acceding to two demands: the university expressed in writing support for day care and a health care program.
2 Satisfied with these results, the February Sisters left the building. One historian recounts that "after that action, and a few news conferences over the next several weeks, they [the February Sisters] never met again as a group, although many of the participants remained active in other feminist organizations" (Monhollon 2002, 202) . The February Sisters are local heroes; their actions are memorialized by a plaque at the site of the building they occupied, and the anniversary of their actions continues to be remembered in the local newspaper and on the university campus. Their actions are a well-circumscribed case of serious demanding and so are wellsuited to illustrating how social actors can design demands that generate persuasive force. How did the February Sisters design demands, and why could they reasonably expect them to pressure administrators to accede?
To answer that question, we analyze both the February Sisters' rhetoric and administrators' responses. The February Sisters' rhetoric comprised a 64 leaflet distributed during the occupation of the campus building to students going to Friday films, a statement of action, a position paper, an account of the history of the seizure of the building, a press release, an editorial in the university student newspaper, and their occupation of a campus building. The university's response comprised the minutes of meetings between the university Senate Executive Committee and representatives of the February Sisters, an official university response, and other press coverage quoting administrators. In what follows we show how the February Sisters did more than say "we demand changes" to attempt to influence administrators to accede. As we have shown, just uttering "we demand changes" implies criticism of addressees' moral compass, implies that the speaker can show that she occupies the moral high ground, and implies that the speaker is counting on her occupation of the high ground to influence addressees rather than coercion, threats, and the like. The February Sisters designed their demands in such a way as to make conspicuously visible that they were undertaking and discharging an obligation to live up to the norm of "right makes might"; they thereby redesigned the context to pressure university administrators to live up to it as well-to accede to demands or at least give them a fair hearing.
First, the February Sisters openly made demands. In the leaflet distributed during the occupation of the campus building, they wrote, "We are demanding a daycare center for women on campus," adding that "a complete list of demands" was available at the Student Activities Center.
3
In the mimeographed statement of action distributed during the occupation, they listed six "non-negotiable demands" and began each with the phrase "We demand." 4 In the position paper released the night of the occupation they wrote, "We demand control of our own program. We demand that Chalmers not speak on the topic of achieving equity for women." 5 By openly demanding, the February Sisters repeatedly made visible their intent to influence administrators to accede. Because openly demanding constrained their ability to disclaim the intent to influence by demanding, they communicatively created a context in which they could be held accountable for failing to meet obligations incurred just by demanding. By demanding, the February Sisters stepped outside the bounds of propriety. In fact, the recorder of the minutes of the Senate Executive Committee meeting with representatives of the February Sisters used scare quotes to mark the February Sisters' use of the word "demand": "Chancellor Chalmers cited positive but unpublished progress on several of the 'demands,'" and another university administrator "outlined in detail the University position on the six published 'demands.'" 6 Likewise, a student critical of the February Sisters who annotated a copy of the February Sisters' position paper underlined the word "demands" and wrote, "Note: demands-not requests."
7 Just by demanding the February Sisters incurred an obligation to show that they had good reasons for stepping out of bounds-that they were right to do so and not unfairly impugning administrators' conduct. In other words, they incurred an obligation to live up to the norm that right makes might.
Because undertaking and discharging obligations is the source of persuasive force, ordinarily social actors make special efforts to show they are living up to obligations incurred in the performance of a basic illocutionary act such as demanding. How did the February Sisters not just imply but explicitly show that they were procedurally and substantively in the right? First, they displayed grounds that they were procedurally in the right in the position paper. "The Chancellor has overtly ignored legitimate demands of women at KU for three years," they noted, adding that "program after program has been met with administrators [sic] ennui if not outright hostility." 8 Likewise, at a table in the Kansas Union the February Sisters distributed a history of their actions that began "women have been working for three years through legitimate channels on a number of issues." 9 Second, they provided evidence that they were substantively in the right. In a press statement released to the university information center, the February Sisters referred to "accompanying leaflets" for "reasons for this action."
10 For example, the position paper displayed grounds for their demand for on-campus day care, documenting, for example, the amount and kind of work that women performed at the university and the "institutionalized discouragement of all women to use their talents and skills in areas outside of domestic duties."
11 Similarly, the February Sisters described the handling of birth control at the university health care center as haphazard and inconsistent: "Doctors vary according to personal belief, practice, and mood concerning birth control."
12 By showing that they had good reasons for impugning administrators' conduct, the February Sisters made good on a claim to be in the right.
In displaying grounds for impugning administrators' conduct, they showed that they were counting on their conspicuously occupying the high ground to be the source of their power rather than coercion by occupying a campus building. In their action statement, they explained that they felt the occupation was "a means of obtaining resources to meet the pressing needs of women" and that they did not intend to "damage property or violate laws other than those few central to our act" or to "'substantially obstruct beth innocenti and nichole kathol 66 the operation of the University' in any way."
13 Likewise, in a press release they stated that "our actions are non-violent, non-destructive, and carried out with the specific intention of showing our strength and solidarity, and of drawing public attention to our pressing needs." 14 In press coverage a sympathetic administrator noted the February Sisters were aware that they risked arrest, expulsion, and loss of parental support: "They didn't want to damage anything and they were careful not to." 15 To have damaged property would have made them vulnerable to a charge of threat or coercion-of failing to live up to the norm of right makes might.
So far we have shown that the February Sisters openly demanded and thus visibly displayed their intent to influence administrators to accede and incurred an obligation to live up to the norm of right makes might. They showed that they were in the right by explicitly stating grounds for substantive and procedural criticisms of administrators. Likewise, they displayed that being in the right was the source of might by toeing a line of propriety as they occupied a campus building and explicitly disclaimed violent tactics. But why could they reasonably expect just those strategies to influence administrators to accede?
The visibility of the obligation created a context in which both the February Sisters and administrators could be held accountable if they did not live up to it; the obligation to live up to the norm of right makes might was reciprocal. The reciprocal nature of the obligation is indicated by administrators bringing it to bear in the situation as well. "To achieve legitimate goals by means which can assure their attainment and acceptance," they wrote in the official university position statement, "free discussion, recognition of the rights and responsibilities of all parties involved, and persuasion rather than coercion must be employed." Furthermore, they noted, "to accede to the demands made on this basis [occupation of the campus building] would be to violate the rights of all other members of the University community and attack the fundamental liberties of free discussion, careful consideration of alternative courses of action in arriving at decisions, and the rule of reason for which the University stands." 16 The press directly quoted the university position so both administrators and the February Sisters could be held accountable if they failed to act in accord with the norm.
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By visibly and dramatically undertaking and discharging an obligation, incurred just by demanding, to live up to the norm of right makes might, the February Sisters changed the context and thereby created two reasons for administrators to accede. First, administrators could presume the February Sisters would not risk arrest, expulsion, and so on unless they could display that their demands had merit-unless they could show that administrators were ignoring oppressive conditions and failing to live up to procedural norms such as "free discussion, recognition of the rights and responsibilities of all parties involved, and persuasion." This reason created just by demanding is an essential part of the normative structure of demanding, without which its persuasive force diminishes or collapses. If speakers can talk with no risk-no responsibility or accountability-then the talk is cheap and can be ignored with impunity.
Certainly administrators recognized that the February Sisters' talk did not appear to be cheap and in fact sought to undermine its persuasive force-to deny the efficacy of the February Sisters' demanding-by trying to show that they had beat the February Sisters to the substantive and procedural high ground. First, they reported that unpublished progress on some demands was already being made. In newspaper coverage of the event, the director of university relations and development said the university "may have been at fault for not publicizing its efforts more, as the women were unaware of many steps the University had taken and was contemplating."
18 Likewise, the official university position statement noted, for example, that "the Senate Executive Committee has been deeply concerned about equal opportunity for women and has been involved in discussions with the Chancellor and other members of the administration and the staff for some months" and that "Chancellor Chalmers pointed out that significant action already had been taken on many of the women's demands" and listed them.
19 Second, administrators explicitly brought to bear the norm of right makes might as they called for "free discussion" of the issues. In short, the value of the February Sisters' talk is indicated by administrators trying to take their positions for themselves.
A second reason for administrators to accede that was created just by demanding was that by acceding they would avoid criticism for failing to live up to the norm of right makes might. This part of the normative structure is apparent from the February Sisters' metadiscourse about their demand strategy: "Unless Senex gave written commitment to the establishment of a day-care center and the implementation of a health care program for women, . . . we would remain in the building until we were removed by force." 20 To avoid the "bad publicity" (Lawhorn 2013; Rombeck 2002 ) of a charge of coercion-of failing to live up to the norm of right makes might-administrators took the demands seriously. Administrators could have called in law enforcement authorities, but then they would have been vulnerable to a charge of coercion. Thus the February Sisters' extraordinary action and risk of criticism on procedural grounds pressured administrators to publicly take responsibility for their actions and engage in more apparently democratic procedures to address their substantive criticisms.
In sum, the February Sisters designed demands using strategies that constrained administrators from ignoring or perfunctorily dismissing them. Just by uttering demands they implied that administrators were procedurally and substantively in the wrong and incurred an obligation to live up to the norm of right makes might. But they did more, as demanders typically need to do in order for demands to generate persuasive force. They displayed grounds for demanding at all, and by occupying a campus building and disclaiming violence, they showed that they were counting on the rightness of their position rather than coercion to influence administrators to accede. They communicatively designed a "normative terrain" (Goodwin 2011, 291) such that administrators could be held accountable for failing to live up to the norm and so created a reason-to avoid criticism for coercion-to give the February Sisters' demands serious consideration.
conclusions
In short, by openly demanding, the February Sisters made visible their intent and concomitant obligation to live up to the norm of right makes might. Because the obligation was reciprocal, the strategy communicatively changed the scene to create two reasons for administrators to accede. First, administrators could reason that the February Sisters would not risk resentment unless they could show good reasons for staking a claim to the substantive and procedural high ground. Second, the February Sisters could reason that administrators would accede rather than risk criticism for failing to live up to the norm of right makes might. The February Sisters' rhetoric was designed to display grounds for presumptions generated just by uttering demands-to show they were in the right procedurally and substantively. Likewise, occupying the campus building and disclaiming violence were designed to display that they were counting on their being in the right-not coercion-to influence administrators to live up to that same norm and accede, or at least engage in "free discussion."
Our analysis shows why demanding is a fundamental strategy for resisting oppression. Persuasive effects may not be immediate; social actors may need to demand and engage in other rhetorical activities for days or decades to create conditions in which it becomes increasingly difficult to make sexist, racist, homophobic, and other derogatory remarks and to turn a blind eye to systemic sexism, racism, homophobia, and the like with impunity. Demanding may not only serve identitarian desiderata of a more just political culture but also reaffirm a fundamental norm of political interaction by bringing to bear the norm of right makes might.
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